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I.  INTRODUCI-10~ 
The  current  structure  of  financial  intermediation 
and  monetary  policy  in  New  Zealand  provides  an 
interesting  environment  for  examining  some  recent 
work  by  Fama  (1980,  1983)  concerning  unregulated 
financial  systems  and price  level  determinacy.  In New 
Zealand,  banks  are not  subject  to interest  rate  regula- 
tions  or reserve  requirements.  Currency  is also  sup- 
plied  elastically,  and  yet  monetary  policy  has  been 
able  to  exert  control  over  prices  and  to  reduce  infla- 
tion  substantially.  These  attributes  of New  Zealand’s 
financial  system  seemingly  are  at odds  with  Fama’s 
analysis  since  in the  absence  of currency  control  he 
emphasizes  the  use  of noninterest-bearing  required 
reserves  as a means  of establishing  a well-defined  real 
value  of  a  medium  of  exchange. 
A closer  look  at the  operations  of the  Reserve  Bank 
of New  Zealand,  however,  reveals  an important  legal 
restriction  governing  the  settlement  of accounts  be- 
tween  a bank  and  the  Reserve  Bank.  This  restric- 
tion,  together  with  the  operating  procedures  used  by 
the  Reserve  Bank,  creates  a well-defined  demand  for 
an  asset  whose  nominal  supply  is under  the  direct 
control  of  the  central  bank.  This  asset,  called  ex- 
change  settlement  funds  or cash,  pays  a below-market 
rate  of  interest.  Thus  the  general  thrust  of  Fama’s 
work  on  price  level  determinacy  holds. 
It is also interesting  to  study  the  procedures  of the 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  Zealand  from  a  monetarist 
perspective.  The  Reserve  Bank  of New  Zealand  cur- 
rently  uses  a quantity-based  procedure  rather  than 
an  interest  rate  instrument  in conducting  monetary 
policy.  Like  most  central  banks,  however,  the 
Reserve  Bank  is  averse  to  directly  controlling  the 
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stock  of  currency.  Given  the  absence  of  reserve 
requirements  the  only  other  remaining  quantity  to 
target  is excess  reserves.  The  level  of  this  target  is 
extremely  low  compared  to  the  size  of  the  banking 
system  and  implies  that  monetary  policy  is  imple- 
mented  through  its influence  on  a very  small percen- 
tage  of the  monetary  base.  Also,  as mentioned  these 
excess  reserves  or  settlement  funds  pay  interest. 
Thus  the  operating  procedures  of the  Reserve  Bank 
of  New  Zealand  impose  a  very  small  cost  on  the 
banking  system  compared  to  the  costs  imposed  by 
most  other  institutional  frameworks  for  monetary 
policy.  New  Zealand’s  arrangements,  therefore, 
appear  to  be  a relatively  efficient  means  of  anchor- 
ing  the  monetary  system. 
This  paper  outlines  the  major  aspects  of monetary 
procedures  in New  Zealand  and  examines  how  these 
procedures  affect  the  price  level.  Section  II  briefly 
examines  the  setting  for Reserve  Bank  operating  pro- 
cedures.  Although  New  Zealand  does  not  conform 
to  any  of the  specific  examples  stressed  by  Fama  that 
allow  for  price  level  determinacy,  the  monetary 
system  does  meet  his general  requirements.  Section 
III  presents  a  model  of  bank  behavior  based  on  a 
precautionary  demand  for  exchange  settlement  or 
excess  reserves.  The  model  draws  on  past  work  on 
the  precautionary  demand  for  money,  most  notably 
Poole  (1968).  In Section  IV the  model’s  equilibrium 
and  the  determination  of prices  are  discussed,  while 
in Section  V some  extensions  are examined.  Section 
VI  concludes  the  paper. 
II.  PRICE  LEVEL  DETERM~NACY AND 
MONETARY  POLICY IN NEW  ZEALAND 
Issues Concerning  Price  Level  Determinacy 
In  some  influential  work  Fama  (1980,  1983) 
examines  the  behavior  of economies  with unregulated 
financial  intermediation  and  analyzes  the  conditions 
under  which  a purely  nominal  commodity  serves  as 
a numeraire.  Banks  in his world  provide  two  related 
services.  They  provide  an  accounting  system  of 
exchange  that  keeps  track  of  exchanges  of  wealth 
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transforming  one  form  of wealth  (a particular  port- 
folio)  into  another.  This  activity  is related  to banks’ 
role  in the  exchange  process  because  the  recipient 
of a wealth  transfer  may  wish  to  hold  his  wealth  in 
a  form  that  differs  from  that  transferred  by  the 
initial holder.  Since  deposits  are heterogeneous  (every 
deposit  may  represent  a  claim  to  a different  set  of 
underlying  assets),  there  is  no  sense  in  which  a 
generic  deposit  can serve  as a numeraire.  Indeed,  this 
unregulated  world  is not  a monetary  economy  and 
has  no  object  that  resembles  what  is  currently 
referred  to  as  money. 
To  introduce  a nominal  commodity  that  serves  as 
a medium  of exchange  into this abstract  environment, 
Fama  analyzes  a number  of monetary  arrangements. 
The  first  relies  on the  introduction  of a noninterest- 
bearing  currency,  which  enjoys  a relative  advantage 
in  certain  types  of  transactions.  The  government 
monopolizes  the  printing  of currency  and sells a given 
quantity  to  banks  for  assets.  Banks  hold  the  cur- 
rency  for customers  who  may wish to exchange  assets 
for  currency.  To  get  a well-defined  price  level,  or 
real value  for currency,  there  must  be  a well-defined 
demand  and  supply  of currency,  and  currency  must 
earn  a  below-market  rate  of  return  (see  Patinkin). 
Because  currency  is valued  for its transaction  services 
there  is  a real  demand  for  it,  and  the  government 
is able  to  fix its  nominal  supply.  As Wallace  (1983) 
stresses,  the  government  must  prohibit  privately 
issued  competing  transactions  instruments  (e.g.,  small 
denomination  interest-bearing  securities)  for govern- 
ment  currency  to  have  value.‘. 
Alternatively,  the  government  could  define  a 
nominal  unit of account  through  reserve  requirements 
on bank  deposits.  Requiring  banks  to hold  some  frac- 
tion  of  deposits  as  noninterest-bearing  reserves 
creates  a well-defined  real demand  for reserves.  The 
government  can  control  the  nominal  supply  of 
reserves  and,  as in the  case  of currency,  produce  a 
well-defined  unit  of  account.  Under  this  system 
nominal  reserves  are  controlled  and  currency  could 
be  issued  passively  (i.e.,  on  demand). 
Fama  also  indicates  that  a  hybrid  policy  of  con- 
trolling  the  sum  of reserves  and  currency,  but  not 
caring  about  their  mix,  is sufficient for defining  a price 
1 Wallace’s  legal  restrictions  argument  is  somewhat  severe. 
Privately  issued  bearer  notes  would  be consistent  with  price  level 
determinacy  if the  government  auctioned  off rights  to  print  a 
fiied  value  of notes  and  required  a below-market  yield  on these 
notes. 
level.  In  New  Zealand,  none  of the  above  policies 
are followed.  There  are no reserve  requirements  and 
currency  is issued  passively.  What  the  Reserve  Bank 
of New  Zealand  does  is control  the  quantity  of the 
transactions  medium  used  to settle  interbank  balances 
between  banks  in the  New  Zealand  Bankers  Associa- 
tion  and between  these  banks  and the  Reserve  Bank. 
These  settlement  balances,  referred  to as cash,  earn 
6.5 percent  of the  seven-day  Reserve  Bank  bill yield.2 
The  institutional  structure  of the  interbank  market 
and  the  rules  for settlement  set by the  Reserve  Bank 
generate  a  well-defined  demand  for  cash.  The 
Reserve  Bank  controls  the  nominal  quantity  of cash 
implying  that  the  monetary  system  in New  Zealand 
obeys  Fama’s  necessary  conditions  for a determinate 
price  level.  In the  United  States  an analogous  policy 
would  be  controlling  the  supply  of excess  reserves. 
The  Operation  of New  Zealand’s 
Monetary  Policy 
At the  beginning  of each  new  banking  day the  net 
position  of each  bank  from  business  conducted  on 
the  previous  day  is  calculated.  Banks  must  then 
settle  among  themselves  and with  the  Reserve  Bank. 
There  is  a  net  flow  of funds  between  the  banking 
system  and  the  Reserve  Bank  because  the  Reserve 
Bank  serves  as the  government’s  banker.  Also,  the 
Reserve  Bank  does  not  permit  overdrafts  on  settle- 
ment  accounts.  Any  bank  that  has  a net  debit  posi- 
tion  must  either  borrow  settlement  cash from another 
bank  or  rediscount  Reserve  Bank  bills  of less  than 
28:days  to  maturity.  These  bills  are  issued  with  a 
maturity  of 9 1 days and are the  only instrument  redis- 
counted  by the  Reserve  Bank  at a penalty  of 150 per- 
cent  above  the  market  rate  on seven-day  certificates 
of  deposit.  The  discount  rate  penalty,  therefore, 
depends  on the  term  to maturity  of the  bill. To  avoid 
these  penalties,  banks  hold  an  inventory  of cash  as 
well as an inventory  of Reserve  Bank  bills. The  redis- 
count  feature  of these  bills  implies  that  their  supply 
affects  the  liquidity  of the  banking  system  and  that 
their  quantity,  along  with  the  quantity  of exchange 
settlement,  directly  influences  the  price  level. 
A crucial  feature  of the  New  Zealand  system  is the 
uncertainty  involving  movements  in the government’s 
accounts.  These  movements  must  occasionally  cause 
the  banking  system  as  a whole  to  have  a net  debit 
position  with  respect  to  the  Reserve  Bank.  Banks 
can  borrow  and  lend  cash  to  satisfy  net  interbank 
* The  policy  of paying  interest  on  cash  would  be  analogous  to 
a policy of paying  interest  on excess  reserves  in the  United  States. 
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cash  flows with  the  government,  the  banking  system 
as a whole  need  not  hold  cash.  All settlement  could 
be  done  through  credit  arrangements.  Negative  cash 
flows  with  the  government  require  payment  with 
exchange  settlement  or the  rediscounting  of Reserve 
Bank  bills. Since  rediscounting  involves  a penalty  the 
optimal  response  by  the  banking  system  is to  hold 
an  inventory  of  cash  for  clearing  purposes. 
The  primary  instruments  of monetary  policy  are, 
therefore,  the  supply  of  cash  and  the  supply  of 
Reserve  Bank bills. The  supply  of cash  is largely con- 
trolled  through  open  market  operations  which  are 
conducted  in an attempt  to hit a specific  cash  target, 
currently  30  million  $NZ.  Whether  the  end-of-day 
cash  balance  equals  the  target  will  depend  on  how 
well  the  Reserve  Bank  forecasts  the  net  flow  of 
government  transactions.  The  Reserve  Bank  cannot 
afford  to  forecast  or  offset  government  flows  too 
exactly  or  there  will  never  be  a  need  for  redis- 
counting  by the  banking  system  as a whole.  Without 
periodic  rediscounting  there  would  be  no  demand 
for  cash,  since  an  inventory  of cash  is only  held  to 
avoid  rediscounting. 
The  Reserve  Bank  can  also affect  the  demand  for 
cash  through  its  second  instrument,  namely  the 
supply  of Reserve  Bank  bills.  These  bills  affect  the 
liquidity  of the  banking  system.  A decrease  in their 
supply  would  imply  a  greater  likelihood  that  any 
individual  bank  would  not  have  a sufficient  amount 
of bills for rediscounting  and would  have  to incur  the 
additional  transactions  costs  of obtaining  such  bills 
if the  need  should  arise.  Also,  with  a smaller  supply 
of bills,  a bank  caught  short  of cash  would  have  to 
rediscount  bills of a greater  average  maturity,  incur- 
ring a larger rediscount  penalty.  To  avoid these  added 
penalties,  banks  increase  their  demand  for cash.  By 
influencing  the  demand  for  cash  the  supply  of 
Reserve  Bank  bills affects  the  price  level  and  serves 
as  an  additional  instrument  of  monetary  policy. 
III.  A  MODEL 
The  following  model  attempts  to  capture  the 
major aspects  of monetary  operations  in New  Zealand 
and  examines  how  these  operations  affect  the  price 
level. The  most  important  aspect  is the  precautionary 
nature  of the  banking  system’s  demand  for cash  and 
the  role  that  unanticipated  flows  in  the  Crown’s 
accounts  have  in generating  that  demand.  Through- 
out  it is assumed  that  there  exists  a perfectly  com- 
petitive  interbank  market.  In this  respect  the  model 
is similar  to  that  of Poole  (1968)  and  also  is related 
to  much  of the  literature  on  the  precautionary  de- 
mand  for  money. 
The  major  characteristic  of  the  model  is  the 
simple  and  direct  way it relates  nominal  magnitudes 
to  Reserve  Bank  policy.  The  coSt  of doing  this  re- 
quires  the  assumption  that  the  real  and  monetary 
sectors  of  the  economy  are  exogenous.  But  this 
assumption  is  to  some  extent  justified  by  treating 
New  Zealand  as a small open  economy  with perfectly 
flexible  prices  and  a flexible  exchange  rate.  Under 
such  treatment,  the  real rate  of interest  and  the  real 
exchange  rate  are  taken  parametrically  and  are 
unaffected  by  domestic  monetary  policy.  Also,  for 
simplicity,  currency,  being  elastically  supplied  and 
so having  no essential  effects  on any other  variables, 
is omitted  from  the  model.  Adding  a currency  de- 
mand  function  would  only  serve  to  determine  the 
nominal  supply of currency  without  affecting the  main 
channels  through  which  monetary  policy  affects 
nominal  magnitudes. 
The  Real Economy 
The  real rate  of interest,  Pt, and the  real exchange 
rate,  et (expressed  as the  number  of world  goods  per 
New  Zealand  good),  are  taken  as  given.  Thus, 
(I)  it  =  (1 +af)(l+Pt) 
and 
where  it is the  nominal  rate  of interest,  ?rF  is expected 
inflation,  et is the  nominal  exchange  rate  (the number 
of New  Zealand  dollars  per  unit  of world  currency), 
P;  is the  rest  of the  world’s  price  level,  and  Pt is the 
price  level  in  New  Zealand. 
Banks 
The  banking  system  is assumed  to be competitive 
and  provides  transactions  accounts  called  demand 
deposits  to  individuals.  Funds  flow  between  banks 
for  two  reasons.  One  is  that  individuals  transact 
among  themselves  creating  interbank  flows. The  net 
of these  flows  for  the  banking  system  as a whole  is 
zero,  and  it  is  assumed  that  an  interbank  credit 
market  exists  to  handle  short-term  imbalances. 
Individuals  also  transact  with  the  government, 
creating  a  net  flow  of  funds  between  the  banking 
system  and the  Reserve  Bank  of New  Zealand.  The 
Reserve  Bank  does  not  permit  overdrafts  requiring 
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ment  funds  at  the  end  of the  day.  A bank  that  has 
a net  negative  position  with  the  Reserve  Bank  is re- 
quired  to  pay  a  penalty  by  rediscounting  Reserve 
Bank  bills  at a penalty  rate,  rp.  These  bills  are  auc- 
tioned  regularly  by the  Reserve  Bank  and  constitute 
the  only  rediscountable  security  it  accepts.  The 
absence  of overdraft  privileges,  plus  the  penalty  on 
rediscounting,  creates  a  precautionary  motive  for 
holding  a settlement  account  at  the  Reserve  Bank 
and a corresponding  motive  for holding  Reserve  Bank 
bills.  In the  presence  of an interbank  market  it is the 
net  expenditure  flows  with  the  government,  as well 
as the  rediscounting  policy  of the  Reserve  Bank,  that 
creates  a  well-defined  precautionary  demand  for 
exchange  settlement  funds  or  cash. 
A  simplified  representation  of  a  bank’s  balance 
sheet  is  depicted  in  Figure  1. 







A representative  bank  supplies  demand  deposits  D 
at  a  constant  marginal  cost  (Y and  pays  a  nominal 
interest  rate  of rD on the  account.  Banks  hold  at the 
Reserve  Bank cash  or clearin 
r! 
balances  C which  yield 
a  below-market  rate  of  r  .  They  also  purchase 
Reserve  Bank  bills,  RB,  that  yield  a rate  r and  make 
loans,  L,  that  earn  a risk-adjusted  nominal  interest 
rate  of i. A further  assumption  is that  if a bank  does 
not  have  the  necessary  amount  of Reserve  Bank  bills 
for  rediscounting,  it  must  buy  some  in the  market 
and  incur  a  proportional  transactions  cost  of  4. 
Further,  since  rediscounting  is  at  a penalty  rate,  it 
is easiest  to think  of each  dollar of Reserve  Bank bills 
rediscounted  as incurring  a net  proportional  cost  of 
6. Because  Reserve  Bank  bills have  the  added  feature 
of being  rediscountable  they  will never  trade  at a rate 
greater  than  i in  equilibrium. 
Before  describing  the  simple  model  that  depicts 
the  major  features  of  a  bank’s  decision  in  this  en- 
vironment,  it may  be  useful  to highlight  some  of the 
operating  characteristics  of the  interbank  model.  In 
doing  so  I  focus  on  movements  in  the  overnight 
interbank  interest  rate  that  occur  under  various 
realizations  of  stochastic  cash  flows  between  the 
banking  system  and  the  government.  First,  when 
cash  is plentiful  and  all banks’  exchange  settlement 
accounts  have  a positive  balance  at  the  end  of  the 
day,  the  interbank  rate  should  equal  the  rate  paid 
on cash.  If the  interbank  rate  fell below  the  rate  paid 
on  cash,  a bank  would  find  it profitable  to  borrow 
cash  and  deposit  it at the  Reserve  Bank.  Also,  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  lending  bank  it  would  be 
better  to deposit  the money  at the  Reserve  Bank than 
lend  the  cash  at a lower  rate.  If the  banking  system 
on the  whole  is short  of cash,  then  the  interbank  rate 
should  rise  to  the  level  of  the  penalty  rate  on  the 
shortest  available  maturing  Reserve  Bank  bil1.j  If 
the  rate  were  to  exceed  the  penalty  rate,  banks 
could  earn  profits  by  rediscounting  a  bill  and 
lending  the  cash.  The  interbank  rate  will, therefore, 
be  bounded  by  the  rate  paid  on  cash  and  the 
penalty  rate  for  rediscounting. 
Given  the  Reserve  Bank’s  operating  procedures, 
banks  will decide  on  an optimal  level  of both  C  and 
RB.  These  levels  will  be  based  on  the  penalties 
associated  with  rediscounting,  the  opportunity  cost 
of holding  cash  and  Reserve  Bank  bills,  transaction 
costs,  and  the  stochastic  processes  governing  flows 
between  each bank  and the government.  I will discuss 
in  detail  the  simplest  case  in  which  there  are  no 
interbank  flows  and  where  each  bank  realizes  the 
same  stochastic  cash  flow  with  the  government.  In 
this  case  a  representative  bank  can  serve  as  a 
stand-in  for the  banking  system  as a whole.  I make 
this  simplifying  assumption  to concentrate  on aggre- 
gate  disturbances  to  the  cash  position  of the  bank- 
ing  system  as  a whole.  It  is these  disturbances  and 
the  resulting  precautionary  demand  for cash  that  are 
crucial  for  understanding  nominal  determinacy  in 
New_Zealand.  In particular,  let deposits  held at a bank 
be  D  =  D +pg,  where  D  is  expected  deposits, 
p  is  the  price  level,  and  g  is  a  mean  zero  random 
variable  with  a  density  function  f(g)  that  takes  on 
positive  values  over  the  interval  [ -g,  g].  Deposits 
are decomposed  into  these  two components  because 
banks  in  this  model  are  only  able  to  choose  an 
ex  ante  expected  level  of deposits.  Actual  deposits 
will  equal  expected  deposits  plus  any  stochastic 
deposit  flows.  A representative  bank  maximizes  its 
expected  profits,  Q,  subject  to the  balance  sheet  con- 
straint  C +RB  +L  =  D.  Formally,  a bank  solves  the 
optimization  problem  seen  in the  accompanying  box. 
J Note  the  yield  on  Reserve  Bank  bills  should  not  change 
significantly  for  temporary  cash  shortages  since  their  yield  is 
governed  by intertemporal  considerations.  That  is, their  demand 
is  a function  of  expected  future  cash  shortages  as  well. 
16  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1991 -(C+RB) 
(3)  cm;;#L = (i+d+&  -z  p 
9 T,  s 
(C  +RB+pgN(gWg  - 6 
s 
-(C+RB) 
p  -6  RBf  Wg 
+6  2  s  -(C+RB) 
(C +pg)f(g)dg  +  r  -: 
s 
- 
-(C+RP)  (RB + C + pg)fWg 
P  P 











+  iL  -  (rD+cu) 
s 
ii 
_ g (D + pg)f(&k 
subject  to  C +RB  +L  =  D. 
The  first two terms  in (3) represent  the  case where 
there  is a large  transfer  of funds  to the  government. 
For  such  a large  negative  value  of g the  bank  is short 
of  Reserve  Bank  bills.  It  must  borrow  and  pay  a 
brokerage  fee to obtain  the  bills and  then  rediscount 
them  at  a  proportional  loss  of  6.4 The  expression 
inside  the  first  integral  is,  therefore,  negative  and 
represents  a cost.  Furthermore,  in this case the  bank 
must  rediscount  its entire  stock  of bills and  this  cost 
is  given  by  the  second  integral.  When  g  is  not  so 
negative  as  to  force  all of the  bank’s  bills  to  be  re- 
discounted,  the  bank  rediscounts  a portion  at a cost 
6 (the  third  term)  and  earns  r on the  rest  (the  fourth 
term).  When  the  outflow  of funds  to the  government 
is  not  less  than  the  bank’s  inventory  of  cash  (i.e., 
g  >  -C/P),  the  bank  earns  rc  on  its cash  balances 
and  r on all its  bills.  This  realization  is given  by  the 
fifth  and  sixth  terms  in (3).  Finally,  banks  earn  i on 
loans  and  incur  a  cost  of  rD +a  on  each  dollar 
deposited. 
The  first-order  conditions  for  the  bank’s  profit 
maximization  are: 
4 It  is easiest  to  think  of rediscounting  as  a collateralized  loan 
at  the  rate  rp.  In  the  area  of  the  distribution  where  g  < 
( -C  -  RB)/P,  the  bank  essentially  must  swap  a loan or Treasury 
bill  for  a  Reserve  Bank  bill  at  a cost  of 4  per  dollar  of trans- 
action  and  then  take  out  the  equivalent  of a penalty  loan  from 
the  Reserve  Bank.  The  bank  must  also use  its stock  of Reserve 
Bank  bills  to  secure  a penalty  loan  at  a net  cost  of rp -r.  Alter- 
natively  one  could  look  upon  rediscounting  as  involving  a 
proportional  loss  of 6 per  dollar  of bills  rediscounted  (i.e.,  6  = 
rp -  r).  In the  case  where  a bank  is out  of cash  and  must  borrow 
Reserve  Bank  bills,  the  bank  must  first  borrow  the  money  (sell 
off a loan  at  rate  i) to  get  a Reserve  Bank  bill that  earns  r,  pay 
a proportional  transactions  cost  $‘,  and  rediscount  at rp earning 
a proportional  loss  of 6. Thus  6 +i  +$’  =  rp +d~ in  the  paper. 
(4a)  +F(  -“p  RB)  +  r[l-F( 
-CP-RBJ1 
=  i[l-F( 
-c  iRBJ1 
W  (4 - dF( -’  pRB)  +  (r +6 -r’)F($$ 
+  rc  =  ill-F( 
(4c)  rD+c2  =  i 
Since  banks  produce  deposits  at  a  constant 
marginal  cost  the  equilibrium  value  of deposits  will 
be  demand  determined.  The  bank’s  balance  sheet 
constraint  can  be  used  to  calculate  L  once  p,  i, rD, 
C,  and  RB  are  determined.  Given  i, rD is obtained 
from  (4~).  Using  (l),  (4a),  (4b),  and  the  equilibrium 
conditions 
(Sa)  C  =  Cs, 
(Sb)  RB  =  RBS, 
where  Cs  and  RBS are  cash  and  Reserve  Bank  bills 
supplied,  one  can  calculate  i,  p,  C,  RB,  and  r. 
IV. EQUILIBRIUM 
The  simple  model  of  Section  III  is  now  used 
to  analyze  the  equilibrium  determination  of  prices 
and  interest  rates.  One  case  involves  the  situation 
where  the  supply  of  Reserve  Bank  bills  is  such 
that,  in  equilibrium,  (C +RB)/p  2  g.  In  this  case 
equation  (4a)  implies  that  r =i  and  (4b)  implies 
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Reserve  Bank  bills  is so abundant  that  the  marginal 
bill supplies  no liquidity  services  and hence  the  yield 
on  bills  is driven  to  i. When  that  happens  the  price 
level  is directly  proportional  to C because  a propor- 
tional  change  in cash  and  the  price  level  still  solves 
equation  (4b).  Also  if  4 = 0  then  (4a)  once  again 
implies  r = i, and (4b) yields  a solution  in which  prices 
are  proportional  to  cash.  With  no  transaction  costs 
in acquiring  Reserve  Bank  bills,  Reserve  Bank  bills 
and  loans  become  perfect  substitutes  from  an  indi- 
vidual  bank’s  standpoint  and  hence  bills provide  no 
added  liquidity  benefits.  In  these  cases,  marginal 
changes  in Reserve  Bank  bills have  no effect  on the 
real  demand  for  settlement  cash.  Hence  the  price 
level  is proportional  to  the  supply  of  cash. 
Since  Reserve  Bank  bills  typically  yield  less  than 
other  financial  instruments  (i.e.,  r  <  i),  one  must 
conclude  that  (C +RB)/p  <  g.  For  the  simple  model 
with  independently  distributed  flows  among  banks 
this implies  that  at times  banks  may not  have  enough 
Reserve  Bank  bills  for  rediscounting.  The  transac- 
tion  cost  $J  could  then  be  interpreted  as an additional 
penalty  imposed  by  the  Reserve  Bank.  In  these 
circumstances  the  price  level  would  no  longer  be 
directly  proportional  to cash  since  equations  (4a) and 
(4b) would  no longer  be  satisfied  if cash  and the price 
level  were  changed  proportionately  from  their  equi- 
librium  values.  These  equations  would  still  be 
satisfied,  however,  if cash,  Reserve  Bank  bills,  and 
prices  changed  proportionately.  Hence  the price  level 
is sensitive  to the  supply  of Reserve  Bank  bills even 
though  these  bills pay  a competitive  rate  of interest. 
The  sensitivity  of  the  price  level  to  a  financial 
instrument  paying  a competitive  rate  occurs  because 
in  this  case  the  supply  of Reserve  Bank  bills  influ- 
ences  the  real demand  for settlement  cash.  With  the 
possibility  that  a bank  may  incur  an  additional  cost 
of 4,  the real demand  for cash decreases  as the  supply 
of  Reserve  Bank  bills  is  increased. 
In  reality,  each  bank  does  not  hold  enough  cash 
and  Reserve  Bank  bills  to  cover  all stochastic  reali- 
zations  of flows with  the  government.  Yet the  bank- 
ing  system  as a whole  does.  This  happens  because 
the  flow of funds  between  banks  and the  government 
is not  independent  across  banks.  Although  remov- 
ing  the  assumption  of independence  and  analyzing 
idiosyncratic  as well as aggregate  movements  in cash 
greatly  complicates  the  analytics  of  the  model,  it 
should  not  change  the  basic result  that  the  price  level 
is a function  of both  the  supply  of cash  and  Reserve 
Bank bills. Neglecting  independence,  one could  think 
of each  bank  receiving  a stochastic  cash  flow  com- 
posed  of a common  term  g and an idiosyncratic  term 
u,  where  the  sum  of the  idiosyncratic  terms  across 
banks  is zero  and  these  terms  take  on  values  over 
the  interval  [ -a,  a].  Hence,  any  one  bank  could  be 
in the  position  of g  <  (C +RB)/p  <  g +u,  in which 
case  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  would  have 
enough  Reserve  Bank  bills  but  the  individual  bank 
experiencing  the  large  cash  drain  would  have  to pur- 
chase  bills  and  incur  the  transaction  cost  4.  If the 
penalty  for being  unable  to cover  stochastic  outflows 
through  rediscounting  were  severe  enough  (say 
closing  the  bank),  then  the  first-order  conditions 
would  guarantee  that  each  bank  would  hold  enough 
liquid  assets  (C +RB)  so  that  in  equilibrium  the 
banking  system  would  not  be  short  of Reserve  Bank 
bills. 
For  example,  with  a banking  system  composed  of 
two  identical  banks  A and  B,  bank  A would  invoke 
the  penalty  of  being  closed  down  if 
(CA  +RBA)/P  < Zg  - " 'pRBB. 
If  the  penalty  of  being  closed  is  sufficiently  nega- 
tive,  then  the  first-order  conditions  for bank  A would 
not  be  met  unless  the  preceding  inequality  were 
reversed.  Since  each  bank  is  identical;  the  system 
as a whole  could  meet  its liquidity  needs.  However, 
a  solution  with  (CA +RBA)/~  <  g +n  is  entirely 
possible  and  r would  be  less  than  i as long  as there 
is a transaction  cost for purchasing  additional  Reserve 
Bank  bills.  Also,  the  price  level  would  be  sensitive 
to  the  supply  of  bills. 
One  should  also note  that  the  first-order  conditions 
(4a) and  (4b)  depend  on the  form  of the  distribution 
function  F.  The  distribution  of  net  cash  flows  be- 
tween  the  Reserve  Bank  and  the  banking  system  is 
also  under  the  control  of  the  Reserve  Bank.  Spe- 
cifically,  the  Reserve  Bank  can  to  some  extent  con- 
trol  the  variability  of these  flows  and  thus  influence 
the  demand  for  cash.  Hence  different  choices  of F 
can  lead  to  different  equilibrium  outcomes.  The 
Reserve  Bank  can  also  choose  rc  and  6,  and  can 
achieve  the  same  equilibrium  for a variety  of choices 
regarding  F,  rc,  and  6.  Different  combinations  of 
these  instruments  will generally  alter  the  overall  tax 
on  the  banking  system  associated  with  the  Reserve 
Bank’s  monetary  policy.  For  example,  making  cash 
flows  less  variable  would  require  costly  additional 
monitoring  of government  transactions.  There  are, 
therefore,  tradeoffs  between  costs  to  the  banking 
system  and  costs  to  the  Reserve  Bank  in obtaining 
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A  quantitative  assessment  of  these  costs  would  be 
interesting. 
V.  EXTENSIONS 
While  extending  the  model  to  incorporate  some 
stochastic  dependence  among  banks  may  not  quali- 
tatively  affect price  level determination,  it would  pro- 
vide  a framework  for  examining  fluctuations  in the 
interbank  interest  rate.  Interbank  lending  is  an  ex 
post  decision  with  respect  to cash flows and this  rate 
would  be  a function  of given  realizations  of g.  In  a 
setting  where  profits  from  cash  management  do not 
affect  economic  activity,  and  where  the  price  level 
and  other  market  rates  are  not  influenced  by  these 
unexpected  flows,  the  interbank  rate  will vary  with 
realizations  of g. When  all banks  are flush with  cash, 
the  interbank  rate,  under  a quantity  target,  should 
fall to the rate paid on cash.  When,  on the  other  hand, 
banks  are  rediscounting,  the  interbank  rate  should 
rise to the  rediscount  rate.  One  could then  investigate 
how  various  institutional  changes  (e.g.,  with  respect 
to  rediscounting)  would  affect  the  volatility  of  the 
interbank  interest  rate. 
One  could  also  extend  the  analysis  to  consider  a 
banking  system  under  imperfect  competition.  Com- 
paring  operating  procedures  that  use  an interest  rate 
instrument  as opposed  to a quantity  target  would  have 
different  implications  for  bank  behavior. 
VI.  SUMMARY 
This  article  provides  an  analytical  framework  for 
investigating  the  nominal  implications  of  targeting 
interbank  balances  in New  Zealand.  The  institutional 
structure  of the  interbank  market  is such  that  banks 
demand  clearing  balances  for precautionary  reasons. 
The  Reserve  Bank  through  its  supply  -of cash  and 
Reserve  Bank  bills  is  able  to  affect  the  price  level 
and  nominal  interest  rates.  Of  particular  interest  is 
the  result  that  the  supply  of Reserve  Bank  bills  in- 
fluences  the  price  level  even  though  these  bills  pay 
a  competitive  rate  of  interest.  These  bills  do  so 
because  they  provide  an additional  form  of liquidity 
and,  therefore,  affect  the  demand  for  exchange 
settlement  funds. 
Further,  one  observes  that  the  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  Zealand  conducts  monetary  policy  through  a 
reserve  instrument,  namely  exchange  settlement 
funds.  Except  in the  case  of an optimal  deflation,  the 
operation  of  any  monetary  system  that  produces 
nominal  determinacy  must  do so through  some  sort 
of  efficiency  loss.  One  part  of  the  efficiency  loss 
arises  because  the  monetary  instrument  must  by 
necessity  earn  less  than  the  market  determined 
nominal  rate.  Holding  this  instrument,  therefore, 
incurs  an  opportunity  cost  [for a more  detailed  dis- 
cussion  of  efficiency  losses  see  Wallace  (1983)]. 
While  all  central  banks  prohibit  interest  on  cur- 
rency,  New  Zealand’s  system  seems  to  impose  a 
smaller  tax  on  its  banking  system  than  most  other 
monetary  systems.  There  are  no  reserve  require- 
ments.  Moreover,  excess  reserves,  which  constitute 
a small fraction  of bank  assets,  do earn  some  interest. 
The  full  cost  borne  by  New  Zealand  banks  also 
involves  any  interest  differential  between  Treasury 
bills  and  Reserve  Bank  bills  as  well  as  any  costs 
incurred  through  rediscounting.  These  costs  still 
appear  relatively  small  so  it may  well  be  that  New 
Zealand’s  monetary  policy  will  be  a  precursor  for 
other  central  banks. 
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